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Abstract
This paper analyzes greenhouse gas emissions that build up an
atmospheric stock which depreciates over time. Weakly renegotiation-
proof and subgame perfect equilibria in a game of international emis-
sion reduction exist if countries put a sufficiently high weight on fu-
ture payoffs, even though there is a discontinuity in the required dis-
count factor due to the integrity of the number of punishing countries.
Treaties are easier to reach if the gas depreciates slowly.
Keywords: global warming; international agreement; weak renegoti-
ation-proofness
JEL: Q54; F53; H41
1 Introduction
International negotiations aiming at mitigating global warming often fail.
No country has to participate in a climate agreement and all countries can
renegotiate at any time, especially if governments change due to regular
elections. Therefore, a self-enforcing climate agreement has to be both in-
dividually and collectively rational.
∗TU Braunschweig, Institut fu¨r Volkswirtschaftslehre, Spielmannstr. 9, 38106 Braun-
schweig, Germany. This research project is partially funded by the German Federal
Ministry of Education and Research (Bundesministerium fu¨r Bildung und Forschung,
01UN1006A) as part of the research project ”STROM - Strategic options of the automo-
bile industry for the migration towards sustainable drivetrains in established and emergent
markets”.
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Collective action concerning climate policy has been analyzed by several
game-theoretical contributions applying dynamic models of international en-
vironmental public good provision. Barrett (1999, 2002), Asheim et al.
(2006), Froyn and Hovi (2008), Asheim and Holtsmark (2009) as well as
Kratzsch et al. (2010) consider an infinitely repeated N -player prisoner’s
dilemma game, with a stage game giving each country the choice between
participating in an agreement that induces an emission reduction and re-
jecting the agreement. All authors assume that payoffs are identical in each
stage game, i.e., there is no lasting effect of a one-period emission over time.
In the context of global warming, these approaches appear appropriate if
the emitted greenhouse gas possesses only a short atmospheric lifetime, as
for example methane.
However, most greenhouse gases that contribute to global warming last
for a long period of time (Houghten et al. 1995, p. 22): Emissions in period t
build up an atmospheric stock that depreciates slowly over time. Therefore,
to treat the problem of greenhouse gas emissions properly, payoffs in each
future period have to depend on all former emissions by all countries.
Full participation in a climate agreement is essential to mitigate global
warming effectively. If only a subset of countries participates in an agree-
ment while the world supply of fossil fuels remains fixed, reductions in the
demand for fossil fuels will merely lower the world price of carbon and pro-
voke non-participating countries to consume what the participating coun-
tries have saved (Sinn 2008). The so-called “green paradox” sows seeds of
doubt about the benefit of partial agreements.
This paper explicitly formalizes the stock of one emitted greenhouse gas
with a long lifetime like carbon dioxide. By approximating the cost of global
warming depending on the concentration of atmospheric carbon dioxide, we
can identify equilibria in the greenhouse gas stock game where all countries
are willing to sign a climate agreement and reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
2 The model
We consider a world consisting of i = 1, ..., N identical countries. The coun-
tries face a public bad that is represented by the total stock G of greenhouse
gases (GHGs) beyond its natural level, normalized to 0. Let 0 < q < 1 be
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the share of the existing stock of GHGs that is not dissipated from the at-
mosphere within a period and hence still remains in the atmosphere in the
following period. Each country emits gi,t units of GHGs during period t.
Following Dutta and Radner (2009), the law of motion for the global stock
of GHGs is
Gt = qGt−1 +
N∑
i=1
gi,t. (1)
The costs of global warming to a country in period t depend on the total
stock of GHGs and are approximated by
wt(Gt) = Gt. (2)
The costs are increasing with a higher stock of GHGs due to a costly change
in the associated climatic conditions. Like Dutta and Radner (2009), we
assume linear costs of climate change, although, in reality, these costs can
become very non-linear, for example in the case of non-linear feedback effects
such as the melting of the polar ice caps or the leakage of methane induced
by permafrost melting. However, there is little scientific consensus on the
correct form of non-linearity in climate costs, and to the extent that the
world might continue to stay in the linear cost segment for the next 50 or 100
years – which appears to be the more relevant time-frame due to discounting
– our results can be seen as approximations of a non-linear model.
In every period of the infinitely repeated game, each country has to
determine its level of GHG emissions, which is given by
gi,t = (1− αi,t) g, (3)
where g > 0 represents the highest level of a country’s GHG emissions,
and 0 ≤ αi,t ≤ 1 applies. Country i can either completely avoid emissions
(αi,t = 1), emit the highest level (αi,t = 0) or emit something in between.
Reducing emissions is costly, and we assume that a country’s abatement
costs increase with the level of emission reduction:
Ci,t = αi,tc, (4)
where the parameter c > 0 represents the costs to a country of abating g.
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One country’s emission of gi,t units of GHGs in period t causes additional
climate costs for every country in the amount of
∆wt =
∞∑
τ=t
(qδ)τ−tgi,t =
(1− αi,t) g
1− qδ , (5)
where 0 < δ < 1 represents the countries’ common discount factor.
In the following, we assume that each country’s costs of abating g in
period t exceed the climate costs to the country that are induced by the
emission of g in period t:
(A1) c >
g
1− qδ .
Each single country does not internalize the climate costs imposed on all
other countries but solely considers its own climate costs when determining
the level of GHG emissions. Since it is more costly to reduce emissions than
to handle climate change, no country will rationally reduce emissions on its
own. Therefore, the Nash-equilibrium is characterized by α∗ = 0.
3 Climate negotiations
Now we consider an indefinite game of climate negotiations. We call the
equilibrium with zero emissions climate agreement. Payoffs of a climate
agreement are as follows: Let k be the number of countries that participate
in the agreement and reduce emissions to zero. Each country saves climate
costs in the amount of
∆wtk =
g
1− qδ k. (6)
If no country reduces emissions, each country’s payoff equals 0. Those coun-
tries that reduce emissions to zero have to bear abatement costs in the
amount of c. Their payoff equals
g
1− qδ k − c. (7)
We assume for the number of negotiating countries N that
(A2) N >
⌊
c(1− qδ)
g
⌋
,
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where the brackets symbolize the floor function which refers to the largest
previous integer. From assumption (A2) follows that a global climate agree-
ment with full participation is a Pareto improvement to the Nash equilibrium
because
g
1− qδN − c > 0. (8)
4 Punishment
Similar to Froyn and Hovi (2008), a global climate agreement with complete
emission reduction can be achieved if a deviating country is punished by
a restricted number of countries that emit GHGs in the following period,
a strategy called penance-m: Every country reduces emissions, as long as
all other countries reduce emissions, too. If a country deviates by emitting
more than zero, it is punished by m ∈ N countries that emit (1− α)g with
0 ≤ α < 1 in the following period while the N −m − 1 countries and the
deviating country emit zero. If one of the m punishing countries deviates
from the punishment and emits more than (1 − α)g, it is punished by m
countries that will emit (1−α)g in the following period while the N −m−1
countries and the deviating country emit zero.
Proposition 1. If assumptions (A1) and (A2) hold and abatement costs
are not too high, i.e.
c <
2g
1− qδ ,
there exists a subgame perfect and weakly renegotiation-proof equilibrium
with m = 1 and
α = 1− c(1− qδ)− g
gδ
,
if the weight that countries place on future payoffs is sufficiently high, i.e.
δ > δˆ =
c− g
g + cq
.
Proof
Subgame perfection in period t requires that no country has an incentive to
deviate from the treaty given any history τ = . . . , t − 2, t − 1. The payoff-
maximizing deviation from an emission reduction obligation is to emit as
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much as possible. Therefore, if the following three conditions hold, the
equilibrium is subgame perfect:
1. Given that all countries reduce emissions, a single country must have
no incentive to emit g.
2. A country that has to punish and therefore to emit (1−α)g in period
t must have no incentive to emit g.
3. In a period of punishment, all N − m non-punishing countries must
have no incentive to emit g.
We assume that a country that has to punish in period t does not belong
to the m punishing countries in period t+ 1. Condition 2 requires that
δt
(
g
1− qδ (N −m) + (m− 1)
αg
1− qδ
)
+ δt+1
(
g
1− qδ (N −m) +m
αg
1− qδ − c
)
≤
δt
(
g
1− qδ (N −m) +m
αg
1− qδ − αc
)
+ δt+1
(
g
1− qδN − c
)
.
(9)
Hence, condition 2 is fulfilled if
m ≥ α
1− α
c(1− qδ)− g
gδ
. (10)
Condition 1 requires that
δt
g
1− qδ (N − 1) + δ
t+1
(
g
1− qδ (N −m) +m
αg
1− qδ − c
)
≤
δt
(
g
1− qδN − c
)
+ δt+1
(
g
1− qδN − c
)
.
(11)
Solving for the number of punishing countries leads to
m ≥ 1
(1− α)
c(1− qδ)− g
gδ
, (12)
which means that if condition 1 is fulfilled, condition 2 is also fulfilled.
Condition 3 requires that
δt
(
g
1− qδ (N −m− 1) +m
αg
1− qδ
)
+ δt+1
(
g
1− qδ (N −m) +m
αg
1− qδ − c
)
≤
δt
(
g
1− qδ (N −m) +m
αg
1− qδ − c
)
+ δt+1
(
g
1− qδN − c
)
.
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(13)
Solving for the number of punishing countries leads to
m ≥ 1
(1− α)
c(1− qδ)− g
gδ
, (14)
which is equivalent to the constraint derived from condition 1.
The agreement must also be renegotiation-proof (Farrell and Maskin,
1989: 330–331), i.e., in a period of punishment all m punishing countries
must have no incentive to reduce collectively emissions to zero,
δt
(
g
1− qδN − c
)
+ δt+1
(
g
1− qδN − c
)
≤
δt
(
g
1− qδ (N −m) +m
αg
1− qδ − αc
)
+ δt+1
(
g
1− qδN − c
)
.
(15)
Then,
m ≤ c(1− qδ)
g
(16)
must hold.
To summarize, if there is a natural number m that fulfills
1
(1− α)
c(1− qδ)− g
gδ
≤ m ≤ c(1− qδ)
g
, . (17)
the climate agreement is subgame perfect and renegotiation-proof.
Let c < 2g/(1− qδ). Then, there is only one punishing country, m = 1.
It follows that the fraction of emission reduction in a period of punishment
equals
αm=1 = 1− c(1− qδ)− g
gδ
. (18)
Because δ ≥ δˆ, it holds that αm=1 ≥ 0.
By assumption (A1), c(1 − qδ)/g > 1, bc(1− qδ)/gc ≥ 1 and therefore
α < 1. Because 0 < q < 1 and (A1), c > g and therefore δˆ > 0.
Furthermore, because c < 2g1−q , it holds that δˆ = (c− g)/(g + cq) < 1.
Corollary 1. For all 0 ≤ α < 1, 0 < g, 0 < q < 1 and 0 < δ < 1 there exists
a subgame perfect and weakly renegotiation-proof equilibrium with m ∈ N
punishing countries if (A1), (A2) and (17) hold.
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Figure 1: Areas of equilibria with c = 35, g = 1, N = 150 and q = 0.97.
Figure 1 illustrates equilibrium areas given by corollary 1 as a combina-
tion of the fraction of emission reduction for punishment α and the discount
factor δ for various numbers of punishing countries. For every given number
of punishing countries m ∈ N, the discount factor must be high enough in
order to fulfill the three conditions for subgame perfection. Furthermore,
it is capped by the condition for renegotiation-proofness. Equilibrium ar-
eas for various discount factors are disjoint: There exists at most exactly
one natural number of punishing countries for a certain discount factor that
fulfills (17), because provided that assumption (A1) holds,
c(1− qδ)
g
− 1
(1− α)
c(1− qδ)− g
gδ
< 1. (19)
Equilibrium areas are discontinuous in the discount factor. The disconti-
nuity follows from the requirement that the number m that fulfills condition
(17) for weakly renegotiation-proofness has to be a natural number. For
some combinations of α and δ only a non-natural number fulfills (17).
As Figure 1 shows, for δ < 0.85 there is no combination of m and α
that leads to an equilibrium. Furthermore, a climate agreement is the more
likely, the lower the fraction α of emission reduction for punishment. A
hard punishment, i.e. full emission with α = 0, enables a treaty for most
discount factors. However, if there would be a treaty with a higher α, the
higher α leads to lower emissions during a punishment phase and is therefore
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Figure 2: Areas of equilibria with c = 35, g = 1, N = 150 and α = 0.
preferable from an environmental point of view.
Figure 2 illustrates equilibrium areas as a combination of the discount
factor and the fraction of emissions that remain in the atmosphere per period
when α = 0. In the blue area there is no need for a treaty because (A1) does
not hold. Successively below are the areas for m = 1 up to m = 34. The
figure shows that the lower q, the more weight countries have to place on
future payoffs if an agreement shall be reached. This is due to the fact that
greenhouse gases with a long lifetime induce costs in all future periods as
long as these gases are not dissipated, whereas short-lived greenhouse gases
only induce costs for fewer periods. Furthermore, the number of countries
needed in the punishment phase rises when q shrinks.
5 Concluding Remarks
Greenhouse gases build up a stock that influences the climate. By explicitly
modeling the depreciation of emitted gases we generalize some results from
models that analyze a flow of emissions. Furthermore, we identify some
effects that do not occur if emissions are modeled as a flow: Treaties are
easier to reach for long lasting greenhouse gases than for short living gases.
Because only a natural number of countries can punish, the areas where
equilibria exist are not connected: There are parameter combinations where
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a treaty is possible with a low δ and a larger number of punishing countries.
However, if δ is higher an equilibrium may not be possible due to the dis-
continuity in the discount factor. To treat short-lived gases more countries
have to emit if a punishment is necessary.
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